Concepts: Where cognitive science went wrong / Концепты: Где ошибается когнитивная наука
Год выпуска: 1998
Автор: Jerry Alan Fodor / Джерри Алан Фодор
Жанр: Философия сознания, философия языка
Издательство: Clarendon press
ISBN: 0-19-823637-9
Формат: PDF
Качество: OCR без ошибок
Количество страниц: 187
Язык: English / английский
Описание: Проблема формирования общих понятий занимает важное место в современной философии сознания и когнитивистике. Решить ее пытаются с позиций лингвистики, биологии, психологии, кибернетики и т. д. Джерри Фодор предлагает концепцию, позволяющую соединить достоинства этих подходов и в то же время преодолеть свойственные им ограничения.
Аннотация от издательства: The renowned philosopher Jerry Fodor, a leading figure in the study of the mind for more than twenty years, presents a strikingly original theory on the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts have been mistaken. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic theory of concepts, deals out witty and pugnacious demolitions of rival theories, and suggests that future work on human cognition should build upon new foundations.
This lively, conversational, and superbly accessible book is the first volume in the Oxford Cognitive Science Series, where the best original work in this field will be presented to a broad readership. Concepts will fascinate anyone interested in contemporary work on mind and language. Cognitive science will never be the same again.
Оглавление
Abbreviations and typographical conventions xii
1 Philosophical Introduction: The Background Theory 1
2 Unphilosophical Introduction: What Concepts Have To Be 23
3 The Demise of Definitions, Part I: The Linguist's Tale 40
4 The Demise of Definitions, Part II: The Philosopher's Tale 69
5 Prototypes and Compositionality 88
Appendix 5A: Meaning Postulates 108
Appendix 5B: The ‘Theory Theory’ of Concepts 112
6 Innateness and Ontology, Part I: The Standard Argument 120
Appendix 6A: Similarity 144
7 Innateness and Ontology, Part II: Natural Kind Concepts 146
Appendix 7A: Round Squares 163
Bibliography 167
Author index 173
